Claude Code Security and Magecart: Getting the Threat Model Right
When a Magecart payload hides inside the EXIF data of a dynamically loaded third-party favicon, no repository scanner will catch it – because the malicious code never actually touches your repo. As teams adopt Claude Code Security for static analysis, this is the exact technical boundary where AI code scanning stops and client-side runtime execution begins. A detailed analysis of where Claude Code Security stops — and what runtime monitoring covers — is available here. A Magecart skimmer recently found in the wild used a three-stage loader chain to hide its payload inside a favicon's EXIF metadata — never touching the merchant's source code, never appearing in a repository, and executing entirely in the shopper's browser at checkout. The attack raises a question that’s worth getting precise about: which category of tool is actually supposed to catch this? Magecart‑style attacks are rarel
Source: https://thehackernews.com/2026/03/claude-code-security-and-magecart.html
